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Mass Bombing

Some Moral and Historical Perspectives
Donald M. Schurman

Introduction

T

his paper was originally
delivered at and published by an
International Peace Conference in Fiji
in January 1985. It was written long
before the Canadian War Museum
was forced to debate the question
of the most appropriate manner in
which the contribution of Canadians
in Bomber Command should be
addressed. My interest in the subject
was not to pronounce on the morals
of the bombing of civilians, but to
try to pinpoint some of the thinking
that characterized the attitude of the
Royal Air Force and Englishmen and
Canadians and their governments
towards the campaign. As the paper
shows, the Canadians were a part of
the Royal Air Force. Quite apart from
integration of the Royal Canadian
Air Force into the British service, the
Canadian air force had not the means
or capacity to deliver, by itself, a blow
that would have crippled anything
significant in Germany. I think that
crews were surprised by the now
very controversial Dresden Raid of
February 1945, but they did not object
to doing it. My reference to Kurt
Vonnegut’s account of the Dresden
raid is not an endorsement of him,
but a deliberate use of his novelistic
skill to focus attention when I was in
Fiji as a lecturer among an unknown
audience.

Abstract: This paper is an account
by a historian, who participated in
the bombing of Germany (1944-45),
of attitudes towards the campaign
on the part of military personnel at
the time and since. It examines the
attitudes of the British Government
and their military, and comments on
the way historians have responded to
the evidence since 1945. The problem
of responsibility and justification is
presented in some of its aspects. The
treatment is a mixture of the personal
and the professional.

When I began the paper I saw it as
an attempt to ask where the bomber
offensive had come from, aside
from the obvious one of tit for tat.
The paper traces the development of
the strategic bombing idea through
references to the First World War,
British air operations in the Middle
East in the 1920s, and the Spanish war
of 1936-9, and especially by reference
to the French airman and author
Antoine de St. Exupéry. I do ask the
question “what for,” but that does
not imply any scholarly endorsement
of “Don’t let’s be beastly to the
Germans” as Noel Coward wittily put
it as some sort of theological point.
That was not my idea then, nor is it
now.
The fact is that any debate over
how much force should be applied
at any time, in the middle of a war,
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especially the Second World War,
implies a luxury of means that we
(Sir Arthur Harris) did not have.
My paper shows that. Harris, that
determined figure, kept himself and
his force just ahead of the Luftwaffe
and its ground support. My paper,
dealing so much with attitude, just
manages to include that fact. It
could, perhaps, be argued that more
resources ought to have gone to the
navy. I do not argue it but as a naval
historian the idea has attractions
for me. On the other hand the idea
that the invasion of France would
have been successful, or that it
could even have been undertaken
without Bomber Command seems
wrong to me. My opinion is that
without Harris’s successes the war
would have had a much more
wearing conclusion, to put it mildly.
Harris said, as I note in the paper,
that bombers won it. Surely they
did. However the moralists raise
important questions. The problem
is that war is, as James Wolfe put it,
“an option of difficulties.” To debate
those difficulties is possible, it is not
possible to ignore them. Moral high
ground is a hard place to find in war.
However, Richard Overy’s careful
book Why the Allies Won, comes
closest to supplying the fine print for
my generalizations.

*****
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RAF Lancasters bomb through cloud.

ertainly the most provocative
book about mass bombing in the
Second World War was written by the
American novelist Kurt Vonnegut.
It was about Dresden, and entitled
Slaughterhouse Five.1 In it he quotes
two military men commenting on
the raid on Dresden as presented
in the book by David Irving on the
same subject.2 They were LieutenantGeneral Ira C. Eaker, USAF retired
and Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby,
KCB, KBE, DFC, AFC. He begins with
Eaker:

to do. It might be well to remember

‘Americans have finally heard

Buchenwald and Coventry too.

about Dresden,’ said Rumfoord
[a would-be military historian]

As Vonnegut repeatedly says, ‘So it
goes.’
What Air Marshal Saundby said,
among other things, was this:

twenty-three years after the raid. ‘A
lot of them know now how much
worse it was than Hiroshima. So
I’ve got to put something about it
in my book. From the official Air

That the bombing of Dresden

Force standpoint, it’ll all be new.’

was a great tragedy none can

‘Why would they keep it a secret

deny. That it really was a military

so long?’ said Lily.

necessity, few, after reading

‘For fear that a lot of bleeding

this book, will believe. It was

hearts,’ said Rumfoord, ‘might

one of those terrible things that

not think it was such a wonderful

sometimes happen in wartime,

thing to do.’

I find it difficult to understand

brought about by an unfortunate

It was now that Billy Pilgrim spoke

Englishmen or Americans who weep

combination of circumstances.

up intelligently.

about enemy civilians who were

Those who approved it were

‘I was there,’ he said.4

killed but who have not shed a tear

neither wicked nor cruel, though

for our gallant crews lost in combat

it may well be that they were too

with a cruel enemy…I think it would

remote from the harsh realities

have been well for Mr. Irving to have

of war to understand fully the

remembered, when he was drawing

appalling destructive power of

the frightful picture of the civilians

air bombardment in the spring

killed at Dresden, that V-1s and V-2s

of 1945.

were at that very time falling on

‘So it goes.’3

England, killing civilian men, women
and children indiscriminately, as
they were designed and launched

20
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Vonnegut later introduces this
dialogue:

I was there too.
A subject that is cross-disciplinary
and one that takes an historian
outside his accustomed accumulative
and clinical or analytical roles invites
caution. However, it is my view
that it may be wise to let emotional
overtones ply more freely than is
customary with historical papers if we
are to get more balanced assessments

US Air Force Photo 56330 AC
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from our consultations with the past.
Furthermore, it may be wise to look
at the consequences of having great
technological capacities lying ready
to hand in times of desperation. What
military men, politicians, and indeed
populations do in these circumstances
seems to me to be eminently worthy
of discussion in this nuclear age.
Indeed, it may be that the history of a
non-nuclear age may have something
to teach this present time. Finally, it
should be said that this paper does
not search for scapegoats. It is not a
rush to judgment. Questioning the
effects of the bomber campaign, and
the origins of its programmes, ought
not to be construed as an attack on
the participants, certainly not on the
motives of my surviving friends or
those of our dead comrades. Hitler’s
Reich seemed to me then, as it does
now, to have been an infamous
political horror. I did not regard my
own country or the United Kingdom,

or even the United States in this
light then, nor do I now. However,
as for old veterans who look at any
attempt to discuss their past as an
attack on some sort of Holy Grail,
and who regard criticism as some
sort of treason, I have nothing to say
except that it is 40 years on, and a new
generation must be served.
On the other hand I have some
right to speak. I was a member of
the mass bombing forces in the war
against Hitler. I was at Dresden,
overhead on its night of terror. 5
I have had my face slapped by a
German woman who was a victim
of bombing when she learned what
I had done. My daughter-in-law
was born of German parents. I have
had German students. I have also
taught the history of the so-called
“Strategic Bombing Offensive” to
graduate and undergraduate since
1962. I was also a friend of one of the
few British people with the courage

to denounce mass bombing when
it took place. Both during the war
and after it Captain (later Sir) Basil
Liddell Hart denounced this, what
he regarded as a retrograde method
of warfare.6 I have remembered with
some sense of frustrated misgiving
my own part in it. On the other hand
I still remember my own comrades
with affection, and I attended a
reunion of my own bomber “crew”
in 1984. I do differ from supporters
of the bombing offensive in that I
do not resent present day attacks on
it because some of my friends were
killed carrying it out. Finally, I have
made some attempt to keep up with
the burgeoning historical literature
on the subject. After all I am an
historian by profession.
But I would not undervalue the
usefulness of having a participant
trained, as an historian, consider
this matter. On a topic like this one
is inclined to get views on air war

US Air Force Photo 56330 AC

US Army Air Force heavy bombers drop high explosive and incendiary bombs on Dresden, 15 February 1945.
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Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) PC 2479

Air Vice-Marshal C.M. “Black Mike”
McEwen (right), the commander of 6
Group RCAF, prepares for a flight in a
Lancaster.

from people who have had no direct
connection with it, except that they
have developed, in these tense times,
a sense of immediacy about the
need to control war from the air; or
conversely, one gets talks from those
who want to justify the use of air threat
as a deterrent, and who are associated
in some way with the development of
public military policy. Both kinds of
activists have laudable objectives. I
am different only in that my present
sense of immediacy comes from
my memory of past involvement
as a very ordinary participant and
this experience is filtered through
subsequent professional study as the
facts have became more generally
available.
Let us go back in time. During
the war, of course, every airman who
22
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could think had some idea of what
we were doing. Nobody was much
fooled by talk concerning military
targets around which civilian houses
“just happened” to be grouped
making it unavoidable that some of
them would get the odd stray bomb. I
sometimes thought about that, as did
most of us. However, we were very
young and we thought it a good idea
at the time to kill Germans. We also
had it in mind that the British had had
a good dose of bombing in 1940-41.
Some people knew about the German
bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam.
It was retaliation. We also knew
that on our squadron (in 1945) there
lingered the ghosts of those who had
perfected the system back in 1943,
and they were not simply retired
from operations, they were retired

from life.7 We were not mindful of
those ghosts, whom our ground
crews had known personally, when
we set out on trips.8 Furthermore,
there was the fact that the opposition
was still there, even in the winter of
1945, with real anti-aircraft fire and
real night-fighters to greet those who
thought the war was over. Finally,
I freely admit to strong feelings of
satisfaction with the intelligently
deployed techniques of Bomber
Command generally, and with the
personal and practical performance
of my own crew in particular.
When it ended and we got on the
boat for Canada, Bomber Harris came
to say good-bye. He said to us in the
mess on the Empress of Something or
other, that “when we came to dandle
our children on our knee, and they
asked ‘what did you do in the last
war, daddy?’ you can tell them that
you won it, because you did.”
In my case, for the moment, the
war ended there. The university that
was to be my life gobbled up my
time. I did think about the war from
time to time. A “sincere” but juvenile
essay on the bombing of Dresden
got me a well-deserved D+ from my
English professor. I took the hint
and majored in history. Later I went
to England again, in a new capacity,
that of a research student in history.
During my time in Cambridge I read
the reports of the Nazi atrocities
written up for the Nuremburg trials
until I was too disgusted to read
more. It did, then, occur to me
more strongly that bombing women
and children was not too civilized
an occupation. I noticed also that
Bomber Command did not seem
to be receiving the accolades that a
successful and decisive campaign
seemed to demand. What was the
matter with us? As I began to think
4
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professionally and dispassionately as
he could, chronicled what happened
to Germany from the underneath
person’s point of view. When I
finished reading Rumpf I could no
longer be horrified by tales of frying
flesh. As I had discovered before
in reading the Nuremburg trials
documents, the human mind can
only take in so much horror reading.
Many people seem to have had a
similar reaction to such compulsive
and detailed fact-finding.13
However, help was at hand for
confused airmen like me. Books on the

bomber offensive began to surface. As
mentioned, Hans Rumpf’s book came
on the market giving the picture
from the enemy on the ground. The
four-volume official history, entitled
The Strategic Air Offensive against
Germany was published by Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, over the
signatures of Noble Frankland and
Sir Charles Webster.14 Also, in 1962
R.H.S. Crossman, the British Labour
M.P., wrote in Esquire of his horror
at what had happened at Dresden of how an innocent, non-industrial
town was flattened and treated to

CFJIC PL 40683

about it, it seemed that there were
three central questions. Who ordered
it? Was it right? What good did it do
for the war effort? These are still very
difficult questions. At one level, of
course, Harris ordered it, but a little
reflection makes it clear that he did
not rule the British Cabinet. Generally
speaking the moral question, then
as now, was sluffed off on the basis
of the notion that it was total war,
and after all, it was comfortably but
uncritically held, the Germans began
the bombing. This was denied by
Liddell Hart.9 Practically speaking it
was held to have been essential for
eventual victory. Many intelligent
people believed this then, and they
believe it still. The question of my
own responsibility I have lived with,
as have all the surviving members of
the Bomber Force then and now, some
more successfully than others.10 Some
of us are not such passionate devotees
of pursuing every “war criminal” as
others have been.
I got down to reading the
evidence. What was the evidence?
There was F.J.P. Vale’s Advance to
Barbarism, 11 in which the whole
concept of unrestricted warfare
against civilians was presented as
a return to the days before war had
any rules at all, any code, or any
of what might be called the Red
Cross mentality. The whole thing
was indicated as a policy which the
British and the Americans had been
perfectly willing to execute, and
did, despite the fact that it was a
barbarous way to make war. Another
book that became available then
was Hans Rumpf’s The Bombing of
Germany.12 Rumpf had been a German
urban survival expert, who, as
The pilot and bomb-aimer of a 428
Squadron Lancaster stand beneath the
open bomb bay of their aircraft prior to
an attack on an oil refinery in the Ruhr in
late 1944. The short range to the target
allowed a full load to be carried, in this
case 500-pound, high explosive, general
purpose bombs.
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air propagandists. The idea that its
precision capacities were highly
developed seems to have been
meekly accepted by many Americans.
English and other air historians
have not strongly questioned this
idea.23 It is important to note that
this does not involve an argument
between advocates of precision
bombing and area bombing at the
core. It is really an argument that
American air forces flying to targets
that the Germans perceived as vital
or strategic, invited air combat, and
from that would flow “command of
the air” consequent on the decimation
of the fighter section of the Luftwaffe.
Referring to the “Ultra” report24 it is
extraordinary how arguments about
command of the air over Germany are
interspersed with arguments about
how this fight over Germany took air
command away from the Luftwaffe
on the Russian Front. Furthermore,
German speculation about the effect
of particular raids is meshed with
American speculations about the
same things: that is to say, if a raid was
supposed to achieve such and such an
effect is proven to have occurred.25
Harris, with his photographs of
night bombing, did better than that
- he provided evidence of his own
Command’s limitations as a strike
force. The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (USSBS) had the
opposite object and achieved what
it set out to do. Of course the US
Army Air Forces (USAAF) played a
large part in stretching the Luftwaffe,
but so did the Russians, the Royal
Navy, the Mediterranean Front,
the Scandinavian Front and, of
course, the persistent attacks of
Bomber Command. Quite apart from
questions of morality and target utility
it is difficult to determine whether the
interdiction of parts and fuel moving
to Luftwaffe squadrons was more
due to attacks on communications
centres (cities) than it was to direct
attacks on refineries and oil fields.
Cumulatively there can be no doubt
but that Germany’s pressing need to

defend its cities contributed to the
total stretching of German resources
which was the best help that could
be given the Russians who were,
after all, the ones who defeated the
Wehrmacht. This paragraph is merely
to show that the argument between
“precision” and “area” bombing is
mostly a sham. The only question that
any moralist or indeed realist can ask,
once air war and bombing has begun
is, what determined target selection,
terror, or military purposes (with
communications, strategic supplies,
and the attempt to secure “command
of the air” over Germany) is included
in the term ‘military’? The choice was
not, as will be shown, clear cut. But
it was largely determined by past
thinking about bombing policy.
Who said anything against the
bombing of Germany during the war?
I discovered that George Bell, Bishop
of Chichester, had asked, in the House
of Lords, what the Government
thought they were doing at this mass
bombing game. He was supported
by Lord Lang, the ex-Archbishop of
Canterbury in the House of Lords.26
Bell also carefully distanced himself
from any idea of attacking the
bombing of military targets, or of
the airmen who were the agents of the
government. But he thought the idea
that to strike an industry justified the
obliteration of a city somewhat out
of proportion. He asked whether or
not “old German towns” might not
be next attacked. Archbishop Lord
Lang supported Bell and argued
against the tendency to “gloat”
over the capacity for retaliation,
which he said, showed “real moral
deterioration.” Viscount Cranborne,
replying for the government, denied
deliberate terror, and promised no
abatement due to the duty to “our
own people, their allies, and to the
world. (Cheers).”27 British member of
Parliament Richard Stokes also spoke
out in 1943. He said, among other
things, “we have forgotten out aim,
the preservation of civilization.”28
Similarly, Captain Basil Liddell

US Air Force Photo 57193 AC

round the clock bombing by both
the Americans and us, and how a
firestorm had made the old historic
city one vast flaming coffin.15 It had,
it turned out, happened before at
Hamburg.16 However, Hamburg was
an important port. Crossman was an
indignant man, and he was interested
in assigning responsibility. Perhaps
this Labour politician was aiming at
Churchill?
In any event I had some idea of
what the issues were, and of what the
recipients on the ground thought of
it all. When David Irving’s book on
Dresden came out, I was advanced
enough in knowledge that he did not
tell me anything significant that I had
not known before. The exact casualty
figures are still disputed. Estimates of
the Dresden dead have been put up
to over 200,000, and down to about
30,000.17 Every dead man counts in
Heaven’s scheme of things, but the
numbers game does not alter the
moral problem, does it? In all the war
Bomber Command lost some 50,000
men.
Almost immediately after the
war in 1945 the Americans conducted
and published most of the results of a
survey of strategic bombing.18 It has
since been expanded and amplified
with comment by David MacIsaac.19
As Middlebrook and Everitt indicate,
it is surprising that with the full
and intact records available nothing
similar has ever been attempted
for Bomber Command.20 Whatever
the reason for this, it had the result
that as Chester Wilmot’s 1952 book,
The Struggle for Europe 21 set the
boundaries for the general European
strategic debate for the next 30 years,
so the American bombing survey
established American credentials as
specialized bombing experts almost
by default. Recently, the Ultra part of
that body of information has become
available 22 and from this source
it can be seen that the dominant
power of American “strategic”
bombing is founded largely on the
immediate speculations of American
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Concentrating on blasting three railway centres in the Dresden area,
choke points for the Germans that are headed southeast into the
mountains, Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses of US 8th Air Force blasted
the target on 17 April 1945 with high explosive bombs.

Hart questioned the wisdom of the
Government’s policy. He thought
that Churchill should consider that
bombing (and blockade) “tend to
leave a deeper scar, and have a more
degrading effect, on civilized life,
than what has been experienced
in any modern war.”29 He thought
blitzkrieg, conceived as an army-air
military support system, was humane
by comparison. This was not his only
assault on such methods. Writing
after the war, Liddell Hart stated
that the mass bombing “inevitably
produced a deepening danger to
the relatively shallow foundations
of civilized life.”30 Neither Bell nor
Liddell Hart were then popular for
their views, but both are remembered
for them now with honour – in some
quarters.
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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All that the proponents of air
power had to offer was that bombing
shortened the war by smashing
industrial targets and specialized
industries; that the invasion would
have been impossible without it; and
by some it was argued that the war
would have been over if the bombing
had been supported as a priority
weapon and Harris had been allowed
to go all out.31
Frankland and Webster came
down on the side of the idea that the
invasion needed the air support, but
they refrained from estimating its
total effect, cautiously stating that the
bombers produced “indispensable
military advantages” for the invading
armies.32 Like Harris himself they
seem to have been unhappy with
estimating army support effects. The

fact was that the bombers were never
entirely moved from a strategic to an
army support role. The USSBS, which
had become available shortly after
the war, claimed that terror bombing
was, and had proved to be, much
more overvalued and that specialized
target bombing did the most to
cripple German industry, and bring
on the final victory.33 Frankland and
Webster partially agreed with this,
but claimed that the capability of both
British and American bombing forces
precluded pinpoint accuracy before
1944, when the invasion was made a
priority for support bombing by the
Supreme Command and when the
Norden bombsight became generally
available to the RAF. Their argument
was that bombing competence was
a product of developing skill and
25
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German cities were hard hit from the
air, as these postwar photos of Cologne
attest.
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technology. Certainly an argument
that bombers were all that the British
had to offer in 1942 had strength.
Heavy bombers had begun to roll off
the production lines in numbers at
the precise moment when the British
Commonwealth Air Training Plan
was producing crews in numbers,
and when Churchill felt the greatest
pressure due to the sinking of the
Prince of Wales and the Repulse.
Furthermore the British felt the need
to offer their new allies something in
the way of offensive capability. At that
precise time Harris, not yet chief of
Bomber Command, was in the United
States. He was there at the same time
as the Prime Minister, and he did
have a plan of attack!34 War is, as
General Wolfe once put it, an option
of difficulties. It was not an open
option of clear available choices. No
matter what the consequences, and to
the very last days of the war, Harris
stuck to his terror bombing plan.35 He
was a hard man to convince.
Harris did have his engaging
side. This was revealed in his
unshakeable conviction that in total
war all means were necessary, and
that if the Germans had won he
would have been hanged as a war
criminal. No doubt! And his crews
would have been condemned as
the equivalent of the SS. In a way
the crews sensed this. It is possible
that the solidarity of his Command
in the face of exceptionally heavy
losses had something to do with
a sort of complicity in unpleasant
work. That is a speculation that will
be unpalatable to many, and nothing
more than a speculation.36
There has been no attempt here
to dwell on the fact that when targets
were selected in the last months
of the war it meant devastation on

8
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a vast scale. It was the scale of the
destruction in the final months of
the war that made even Churchill
recoil somewhat.37 The photos of the
German cities bombed provide clear
examples of this. I am not attempting
to state that the Germans as a people
did not invite much of what they
received. Their own methods do not
bear much close scrutiny. Revenge
was not, however, the avowed
purpose of the Allied governments.
The purpose was to win the war,
notwithstanding Richard Stokes’
remark about “civilization.” 38 It is
more interesting to reflect that for
almost 15 years after the war the
number of commentators who even
raised moral or practical question
concerning mass bombing in the
Second World War could be counted
on the fingers of one hand. Why?
Partly, no doubt, it was because
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki (by the very power
of destruction in relation to the size
of the bombs) had obliterated the
memory of previous methods. Also
it was due to the fact that, both from
the point of view of the effectiveness,
and from the point of view of bomber
casualties to our own crews, it raised
unpleasant questions. Winston
Churchill, no stranger to bearing
responsibility, felt it necessary to
duck this burden though privately
he recognized Harris’ contribution
to the war effort.39 Yet the restraint
in public recognition was marked
by many. Churchill shunned Harris,
and he avoided a real appraisal of
the subject in his books. It was clear
that he was not over-anxious to give
emphasis to the bombing campaign
as the war concluded. He stopped the
official survey from going forward.40
This is surely not surprising! The
effect was debatable. Bomber crew
casualties were in high - 55,000 killed;
8,403 wounded and 9,838 prisoners
of war. 41 The destructive results
were horrendous. This was not
encouraging material for a political
apologist to work with!
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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In this context it must be noted
that for many years after the war,
the moral question of whether it was
right to terror-bomb whole cities was
not seriously raised. When Harry
Truman had to make the decision
about destroying Japanese cities with
nuclear weapons, he at least had the
ability to state that he would be able
to save lives on both sides, even if
they were American military lives at
the expense and deaths of Japanese,
both civilian and military. Churchill
agreed with Truman. Even Leonard
Cheshire, the distinguished British
airman who flew with the Americans
as an observer, did not object at the
time.42 Churchill’s use of the bomber
weapon, although it caused as much
destruction, did not even have the
luxury of that clear cut choice. At
any rate the morality of bombing
cities in a mass way was never the
premier question, but I say this in
the belief that Churchill, if I read
him at all correctly, must have found
the choice agonizing. Liddell Hart
would doubtless have questioned
this judgment as other historians
may, on the grounds that it ascribes
too much in the way of humanist
scruple to Churchill. This is a subject
too complex for easy judgment and
I simply record that this view is
controversial. What else could he
wage war with before the Americans
were invasion-capable?
Let us pause and go back before
the war. When the Second World
War broke out what was to have
been expected? The Germans had
used population bombing against
London in 1916-17 and the results
were unpleasant. The population was
nervous.43 The “experts” interpreted
this to mean that weight of attack
would smash morale. After the First
World War it was widely believed by
air power exponents in the United
Kingdom that “the bomber would
always get through” and that the
terror resulting would swiftly break
an urban people’s will to resist. This,
with the Italian Giulio Douhet’s

theoretical backing, became Royal
Air Force doctrine. 44 The British
tried it for Imperial policing. If
peoples in the Arabian Desert, or
on the North-West frontier of India,
resisted a call for an apology for some
“outrage,” then the airmen bombed
their tents, flocks and waterholes.
This had an effect that tremendously
encouraged submission to the forces
of “civilization.” Airmen remembered
how effective this had been! Arthur
Harris was involved in developing
this technique, which offered
financial and practical advantages,
in Mesopotamia in 1922 45 It has
been suggested in a recent and most
perceptive study that this testing
ground was partly responsible for
not only the survival of the RAF as
an independent entity, but also for
its tendency to identify offensive
capability with the bomber and not
with a more balanced force. 46 It is
even more remarkable that it was
Winston Churchill, in his capacity
as a colonial secretary in the Lloyd
George coalition government, who
supported the use of air forces in
such a way, and that he supported
it mainly on the grounds of saving
money and sparing British men.
Based on this criteria, it was effective.
It is also interesting to note that
when reports reached Churchill of
women and children being strafed
in a lake where they had withdrawn
for safety, he condemned the brutality
without stifling the method.47 The
first Labour Government did not
change this money-saving situation,
although that redoubtable MP George
Lansbury acted as the conscience of
the nation when he stated that the Air
Minister and his department were “
the lineal descendents of the Huns,”
and Cox went on to say:
I know there is a sort of feeling that a
coloured person is of less value than
a white person, but I do not think
so. I think you are baby killers, and
inhuman baby killers, whether you
kill a black baby or a white baby. I
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do not see any difference. I think
that one is a crime and the other is
a crime.48

the latter, due to their supposed
temperament. In 1936 the Joint
Planning Committee, chaired by
Arthur Harris, outlined measures to
defend the UK in event of war with
Germany, but it refused to assign
priorities. It opined that without
the threat of bomber retaliation for
both terror and interdiction, other

Meanwhile, as Donald Cameron Watt
says, trenchantly, “For nearly twenty
years the Air Force High Command
had been preaching a strategy of the
Emperor’s clothes being preferred
to one of cutting one’s coat to fit the
available cloth.54
Airmen, in fact, believed what
they wanted. In Spain the horrors of
Guernica were
remembered,
but the fact that
the Republicans
did not submit
easily to air
terror was not.
The point was
made in the
Pa r i s p a p e r s
by the most
famous French
aviator of the
time, Antoine
de St. Exupéry,
but it was not
digested. His
biographer
writes:
CFJIC PL 144265

The point was that terror bombing
was perceived to work. Charles
Portal, who was to play a major role
in the Second World War bombing,
told the Disarmament Conference at
Geneva in 1932
that “criticism of
police bombing
was ‘well
meaning, b ut
ill-informed.’”49
When the
rearmament
campaign began
after 1935 it was
immediately
apparent that
air would get a
substantial slice
of the defence
budget. In fact
it got a healthy
40 percent, a
procurement
r a t i o
i t
maintained
Ye a r s b e f o r e
until 1945! 50 It
the analysts,
is interesting to
the statisticians,
A group of cluster bombs falling towards Hanover, Germany, 25 March 1945.
note that when
a n d
t h e
a joint services
autopsists of
defence measures would prove to be
committee was set up in 1936 to study
the Second World War were to
52
inadequate. Three things are to be
defensive measures against enemy
proclaim what the Goerings and the
attack, they credited the German
noted here. The first is the evidence
Bomber Harrises were too obtuse
air planners with a horrendous
that if terror was available a foe
to understand, what the Curtis
ruthlessness in respect to air bombing.
would use it; second, that the best
Lemays and their ilk have never
In Manfred Messerschmidt’s yet
antidote was counter-terror, and third
been able to fathom. Saint Exupéry
unpublished paper, “Industrialisieter
the underlying assumption was that
had put his finger on the pathetic
Krieg und Volkerrecht in den beiden
terror would work.
futility of mass bombardments. “A
Weltkrieg,” he states that the British
Of course when the war began, in
moral role? But a bombardment is
were programmed to use mass
the days before France fell, Bomber
self-thwarting. It defeats its very
bombing in such a way that is not
Command was not able to deliver
purpose. Each shellburst in Madrid
accurate to state that it was merely
accurate counter-terror attacks, nor
provokes a gradual hardening. What
a response to an enemy that was
was the Luftwaffe able to initiate
was wobbly indifference stiffens. A
51
National Socialist. They estimated
them. The bomber argument was
dead child matters when it is yours.
largely frustrated, to the chagrin of
400 tons of bombs a day for two
A bombardment, it seemed to me,
the Air leaders, by civilian officials.53
weeks would be dumped on the
does not disperse; it unifies. Horror
United Kingdom in either attempts at
The priority was switched to the
induces a clenching of the fists, a
interdiction of food supplies or terror,
marriage of fighters with radar in
closing of ranks in the same shared
and on balance they leaned to the
time to allow the “Few” to work
shudder…. Madrid is there, taking
notion that Germans would favour
effectively in the Battle of Britain.
its blows in silence. But so it is with
28
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man: hardships slowly fortify their
virtues.”55

We now look back at Warsaw
and Rotterdam as moral outrages.
No doubt; and the Germans were
capable of much more than that.
Nevertheless, militarily speaking, it
was the defeat of the Polish Army, not
the bombing of Warsaw, that defeated
the Poles. Rotterdam was bombed as
part of the military offensive and, it
was claimed, as a “mistake” after the
city had surrendered, and had no real
campaign significance. The Battle of
Britain was militarily important in
the war; the Battle of London was
not. There was moral outrage against
the Germans for the Blitz, but it was
accepted as St. Exupéry had predicted
it would be. The British certainly had
no doubt about what they wanted
to do to Germany. Despite the scale
of their effort they failed to conquer
by terror and achieved a debatable
success in the strategic or military
sense, and any reader of Albert
Speer’s diary knows. 56 To be sure
Speer thought that concentrated
simultaneous attacks on all ballbearing factories would have brought
German industry to its knees. He
was ambivalent towards the effect
of area bombardment. I am not
suggesting here that the Germans
would have hesitated to obliterate
London if they had had the power. I
am not advocating German morality
as opposed to British. I am simply
saying that the moral indifference
to mass bombing was international,
and also that, until Hiroshima, it was
based on the questionable premise of
efficiency.
Two other aspects remain.
The first is the fact that the British
Government was more concerned
to give an impression of reasonable
behaviour than it was to carefully
delineate important targets. Perhaps
the nature of the weapons available,
and the slow progress towards
their most efficient use, dictated
strategy, but Churchill considered the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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ramifications of terror bombing and
deliberately chose it. It was discussed
many times in British decisionmaking circles. On 30 October 1940,
in the War Cabinet and Churchill
argued that, “whilst we should
adhere to the rule that our objective
should be military targets, at the
same time the civilian population
around target areas must be made
to feel the weight of the war.” 57
The War Cabinet approved what
they specifically termed “the Prime
Minister’s Proposal.” To say the least,
Harris did not try to dissuade him. It
was only the shock waves of Dresden
that caused Churchill to cringe a
little. Harris did not cringe.58 I think,
however, that enough has been said
here so that one can see that it was
a whole background of theory and
practice that developed the mind-set
with which the air war was fought.
In this sense Harris was a proponent
and agent of an accepted way of
waging air war, and it is manifestly
unfair to saddle him with special
moral opprobrium, when manifestly
he was merely carrying out the wish
of his country men, both in Whitehall
and in the streets, when the subject
is looked at from a national point of
view.
For it cannot be too strongly
emphasized that very few objected
in public. I have named them in
England. In Canada, Prime Minister
Mackenzie King thought that more
airmen waging war by terror would
have saved many lives and money for
Canada.59 The Minister of State for
Air, C.G. “Chubby” Power, stated that
the matter had never been discussed
in Canada’s wartime cabinet.60 There
was a consensus. No Canadian
churchmen objected.61 When Cologne
got its 1,000 bomber raid in 1942
the Globe & Mail stated that it was a
good way to deal with that “Hunnish
hive.” It also said that of the 1,000
Canadians thought to have assisted
in that precedent-making operation,
none, “we may be sure, shirked their
duty!”62 No doubt!

To quote Vonnegut:
‘It had to be done,’ Rumfoord told
Billy, speaking of the destruction
of Dresden.
‘I know,’ said Billy.
‘That’s war.’
‘I know. I’m not complaining.’
‘It must have been hell on the
ground.’
‘It was,’ said Billy Pilgrim.
‘Pity the poor men who had to
do it.’
‘I do.’
‘You must have had mixed
feelings, there on the ground.’
‘It was all right,’ said Billy.
‘Everything is all right, and
everybody has to do exactly what
he does…’
So it goes.63
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